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IN THEWAKE OF LEE V. WEISMAN: THE FUTURE OF
SCHOOL GRADUATION PRAYER IS UNCERTAIN AT
BEST
Stephen M. Durden*

I. INTRODUCTION
One often hears the cliche, "as long as there are tests, there
will be prayer in school." It might also be said, "as long as there
1
are public schools, school prayer will be litigated." Nearly four
decades after the United States Supreme Court first held that
2
school prayer violated the Establishment Clause, the Court re3
cently ruled on the constitutionality of prayer in schools, while
4
it has left other school prayer cases still pending. These pending cases are factually different from the first school prayer
cases; the question will be whether those factual differences
create constitutional distinctions. After analyzing numerous
school prayer court decisions, this article suggests that the Su5
preme Court decision in Lee v. Weisman provides no guidance,
or at best, inadequate guidance determining the constitutionality of prayer given by students at school functions.
Thirty years after the Supreme Court in Engel held that
school prayer violates the Establishment Clause, the Court in

*Stephen M. Durden, Associate Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law.
J.D., University of Florida; B.A., University ofVirginia.
1. The validity of prayer in schools has been litigated for more than a century.
See e.g., Pfeiffer v. Board of Education City of Detroit, 118 Mich. 560, 77 N.W. 250
(1898).
2. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
3. Santa Fe lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). While this article will
not attempt to analyze Santa Fe in depth, Santa Fe is relevant both for the similarity
of facts and the Court's holding. In particular, the Court held "[o]ur analysis is properly
guided by the principles in Lee."
4. E.g., Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 206 F. 3d 1070 (11'" Cir. 2000) (en bane)
cert granted, judgement vacated by Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 121 S.Ct. 31
(2000), and Chandler v. Sieglman, _ F3d _ , 2000 WL 1557134 (11'" Cir. 2000).
5. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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6

Lee v. Weisman held that graduation prayer, a particular subset of school prayer, also violates the Establishment Clause. In
the years between Engel and Lee both the state and federal
courts reviewed a variety of different circumstances in which
7
prayer was sought to be presented at school functions. On the
other hand, some courts were requested to force a school to
8
permit prayer. These lower courts were evenly split as to
whether prayer at graduation violated the Constitution. The
lower court cases dealt with a wide variety of factual scenarios.
Lee, for instance, dealt with the simplest of the post-Engel
9
graduation prayer cases. There, the Court ignored the twenty
year-old standard for Establishment Clause jurisprudence ar10
ticulated Lemon v. Kurtzman. Lemon mandated that, in order
to avoid culpability under the Establishment Clause, "[f]irst
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an ex11
cessive entanglement with religion."' In addition to ignoring

6. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
7. See Kay v. David Douglas Sch. Dist. No. 401, 719 P.2d 875 (1986) [hereinafter
Kay I]; Stein v. Plainwell Community Sch., 610 F. Supp. 43 (W.D. Mich. 1985) [hereinafter Stein I], rev'd Stein v. Plainwell Community Sch.,822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987)
[hereinafter Stein II]; Bennett v. Livermore Unified Sch, Dist., 238 Cal. Rptr. 819
(1987); Lundberg v. West Monona Community Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 331 (N.D. Iowa
1989); Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I. 1990) [hereinafter Weisman I], affd,
Weisman v. Lee 908 F.2d 1990, affd sub nom, Weisman v. Lee [hereinafter Weisman
I]; Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 262 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1989) [hereinafter Sands I],
rev'd Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist. 809 P.2d 809, (en bane) (reh'g denied), (1991)
[hereinafter Sands Ill; Albright v. Bd. of Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist., 765 F. Supp. 692
(D. Utah 1991); Griffin v. Teran, 794 F. Supp. 1054, (D. Kan. 1992); Guidry v. Broussard, 897 F.2d 181 (5'h Cir. 1990); Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township Sch. Dist .• 342 F.
Supp. 1293 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Wiest v. Mt. Lebanon Sch. Dist., 320 A.2d 362 (Pa. 1974);
Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1995) cert. denied, 508
U.S. 967, (1993); Gearon v. Loudon County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Va. 1993);
Lemke v. Black, 376 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Doe v. Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist. 563
F. Supp. 883 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. Sch.
Dist. 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982); Graham v. Cent. Community Sch. Dist. of Decatur
County, 608 F. Supp. 531, 533 (S.D. Iowa 1985); Brody ex rei Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957
F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1992); Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 831, cert.
denied,490 U.S. 1090 (1989).
8. See e.g., Lundberg, 731 F. Supp. At 331; Guidry, 897 F.2d at 181.
9. Other cases also dealt with facts which were essentially indistinguishable
from those in Lee. See e.g., Sands II, 809 P.2d at 809.
10. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The heart of the Lemon test was first set forth in School
Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
11. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (citing Board. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968));
Walz v. Tax Comm'n. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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Lemon, the Court in Lee also ignored its prior school prayer jurisprudence found in Engel and Abington. In deciding Lee, the
Court either failed to answer the difficult graduation prayer
questions raised in the thirty years after Engel, or answered
the questions without referring to any of the factual circumstances related to these difficult graduation prayer questions.
At the same time, the Court eroded the barriers against school
prayer erected in Engel and Abington.
School prayer, in its most basic meaning, refers to a school12
sponsored prayer. Engel and Abington did not deal with complex problems concerning prayer during school hours or during
school functions. Rather, they dealt with a more fundamental
perplexity: whether or not a school-sponsored prayer was valid.
Since the prayers involved in Engel and Abington were during
school hours and on school property, and were both chosen and
given by school officials, they were undeniably schoolsponsored prayers. After Engel and Abington, the Court's focus
shifted from school-sponsored prayer to prayer given at school
functions, such as graduation.
Much of the Court's failure to address the constitutionality
of prayers given at school functions relates to the lower courts'
use of the test set forth in Lemon. While following Lemon's
precedent by lower courts was certainly understandable, the
language in Lemon caused these courts to ask misguided questions. Instead of looking to Lemon, the lower courts should look
to Engel as the framework for their decisions. Although Engel
may not have provided easy answers to all issues, it provided
the lower courts with a better framework for answering the Establishment Clause questions raised in Lee and similar cases.
The discussion that follows first reviews the arguments and
3
responses to Engel v. Vital/ and School District of Abington v.
4
Schemp/ (hereinafter referred to as Abington). This paper
will then examine the post-Engel graduation cases showing the
variety of different factual distinctions in the pre-Lee graduation prayer cases. It will also address the variety of legal questions raised and the manner in which lower courts answered
12. "School prayer," a deceptively simple phrase, could connote "prayer during
school," "prayer in school," or "prayer on school property." These variations of school
prayer have been addressed to some degree in a number of other cases and are beyond
the purview of this article.
13. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
14. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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them. This article further suggests that the Lemon test was not
the best or most appropriate test to use in articulating Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Moreover, this article will demonstrate that while the Lee opinion has more ties to Engel than
Lemon, it nevertheless weakens the standards in Engel. Finally, unanswered questions by the Lee decision will be addressed.

II. SCHOOL PRAYER: A REVIEW OF ENGEL AND ABINGTON
The Supreme Court decided its first school prayer cases,
Engel and Abington, only one year apart. These opinions are
not reliant on the facts involved, but instead focus on the philosophical foundations of the Establishment Clause. Engel
clearly holds that an official school-sponsored prayer program
15
violates the Constitution. However, Abington confuses the
question of whether the school prayer program at issue is distinguishable from the official prayer that was invalidated in
16
Engel.

A. Engel v. Vital

17

In the 1950s, the State Board of Regents for the State of
18
New York composed a prayer known as the Regents' prayer,
19
and recommended that this prayer be recited in class. Complying with the recommendation, the Board of Education of Union Free District No. 9 "directed the School District's principal
to cause the [Regents'] prayer to be said aloud by each class in
20
the presence of a teacher at the beginning of each school day."
The trial court modified the policy by ordering that those who

15. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 430.
16. See Abington, 374 U.S. at 203. Ironically, Justice Brennan's concurrence exceeds 70 pages in the United States Reporter and yet in one sentence demonstrates the
simplicity of the Abington case in light of Engel. "Unless Engel v. Vitale is to be overruled, or we are to engage in wholly disingenuous distinction, we cannot sustain these
practices." Id. at 266-67 (Brennan, J., concurring).
17. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
18. Id. at 423. The prayer read as follows: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our
dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents our teachers
and our Country." I d.
19. I d. at 422. This prayer was included in the Regents' "Statement on Moral and
Spiritual Training in the Schools." Id.
20. I d. at 441. Apparently, teachers lead and joined in the prayer, although that
is not clearly set out in the majority opinion. ld. (Douglas, J., concurring).
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objected be relieved from the duty of participation and further,
21
that the objectors not be discriminated against in any way.
Without significant discussion of the facts, the Court held
that the Regents' prayer violated the Establishment Clause,
"because that prayer was composed by governmental officials
as part of a governmental program to further religious beliefs."22 Where Justice Black did choose to discuss the facts at
issue, he consistently echoed the concern over governmental
creation or involvement in prayer. Justice Black noted, for example, that the State of New York "encourage[d] recitation of
23
the Regents' prayer;" that the school board "directed the ...
princigal to cause the [Regents'] prayer to be said aloud by each
4
class;" and that "each separate government in this country
should stal out of the business of writing or sanctioning official
2
prayers." Such governmental activities easily infringed upon
whatever protections were constructed by the Establishment
Clause. Justice Black further stated that:
[T]he constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as
26
part of a religious program carried on by government.

He summarized his view by using language akin to that of
the Establishment Clause, concluding "that New York's state
prayer program officially establishes the religious beliefs em27
bodied in the Regents' prayer."
The Court never established a test to determine the validity
of the New York prayer. Instead, the court found certain facts
to be of constitutional import. These facts essentially answered
the constitutional question of whether the J>olicy at issue was
one that "establishe[d] a religious belief." The Court found
such an establishment existed and thus did not need to ponder
the more difficult question of whether the policy was one "respecting the Establishment of Religion."
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Engle, 370 U.S. at 423-24 n.2.
!d. at 425.
Id. at 424.
ld. at 422.
Id. at 435.
Id. at 425.
Engle, 370 U.S.at 430.
ld.
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The Court's decision revolved around government actions
clearly demonstrating governmental support for a particular
religious belief. Due to his limited use of the facts at hand, Justice Black did not state which facts were the most significant in
reaching his outcome, or which facts could be changed without
a change in the result.
New York made two arguments in order to avoid a holding
that the prayer violated the Establishment Clause. The Court
simply dismissed New York's argument that the prayer was
constitutionally permissible because it was nondenominational.29 New York's second argument, which merited, or at
least earned, more discussion was that the prayer was valid because the program "[did] not require all pupils to recite the
prayer but permit[ted] those who wish[ed] to do so to remain
30
silent or be excused from the room." This argument intimated
that no one was coerced to pray. The Court summarily rejected
this argument by stating, "[t]he Establishment Clause ... does
not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish
an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce
31
non-observing individuals or not." No governmental body may
establish a church or a religion. Put another way, the Court
held that the Government's constitutional sin is not forgiven
simply because no one is forced to join in the established religion; government and religion may not create a voluntary partnership.32 The "first and most immediate purpose [of the Establishment Clause] rested on the belief that a union of
government and religion tends to destroy government and to
33
degrade religion."
The Court added that although there was no direct coercion
29. !d. The Court gave no explanation why it was constitutionally irrelevant that
the prayer was nondenominational or nonsectarian. The relevance of this issue, however, has been debated by a number of courts in a variety of different circumstances.
See Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 70 of Cleveland County, 766 F.2d 1391, 1403
(1985) (Under the primary effect prong of the Lemon test "it is irrelevant that a practice may be nondenominational or non-sectarian ... ");Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch.
Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 967 (1991) ("The nonsectarian nature of a prayer remains relevant
to the extent to which a prayer advances religion.").
30. !d. The issue of coercion was debated by courts in both the graduation prayer
context as well as other contexts. This issue became central in Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lee.
31. Engel, 370 U.S. 421, 430.
32. !d. at 431.
33. !d. at 431.
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to join in the prayer, the possibility of indirect coercion was not
34
thereby eliminated by the voluntary participation element.
According to the Court, "prescribing a particular form of religious belief' inherently involves coercion of non-observing individuals.35 Once the government places its "power, prestige and
financial support" behind a religious belief, the government
"plain[ly]," albeit indirectly, coerces "religious minorities to con36
form to the prevailing officially approved religion."
Justice Douglas concurred with Justice Black's opinion in
Engel, and although Justice Douglas' concurrence did not specifically refer to the coercion inherent in government support of
religion, he did find an inherent violation of the Establishment
Clause in instances where an~ government funds are used in
3
support of religious exercises. Justice Douglas stated that the
38
issue presented was "an extremely narrow one." The question,
according to Justice Douglas, was whether New York violated
the Establishment Clause when it financed a religious exercise.39 According to Justice Douglas's analysis, a teacher who
leads the prayer does so while "on the public payroll" in a "governmental institution." Therefore, the state is financing a reli40
gious exercise. Any such financin? no matter how minuscule,
1
violates the Establishment Clause.
Justice Stewart dissented in Engel, and that dissent is significant because of his "choice" discussions that included his
42
emphasis on the "voluntariness" of the prayer. Justice Stewart felt that New York merely "permit[ted, rather than forced]
43
school children to say this simple prayer." He ignored the
presence of the teacher and focused instead on the choices
made by the students to say the prayer. Justice Stewart could
not "see how an 'official religion' is established by letting those

34. Id. at 430-31.
35. ld. at 431.
36. !d. Of note is that the coercion the court referred to is inherent in the existence of governmental sponsorship. This is very different from the coercion Justice
Kennedy referred to in Lee. In Lee, the coercion was the social pressure to attend
graduation.
37. ld. at 441 (Douglas, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 439.
39. ld.
40. Id. at 441-442.
41. !d.
42. !d. at 445.
43. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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who want to say a prayer say it." Over the next three decades,
courts commonly reviewed this question of student choice and
its significance within the graduation context.
In the end, Engel answered this very fact-based constitutional question by prohibiting the creation of any official
prayers to be said in schools as part of a state prayer program.
Engel did not define a "state prayer program" nor did it set
forth a test to determine what the Court would consider a
"state prayer program." Engel also failed to create a test for determining when or how a prayer becomes an "official prayer."
However, since each question was answered, the Court perhaps
may have felt that setting forth such tests was unnecessary. In
Engel, the state clearly and admittedly defined an "official
prayer." The state also clearly paid an employee to say a
prayer.
In addition, while the Court did not address Justice Stewart's voluntariness argument, the Court implicitly rejected it.
According to the Court's discussion of inherent coercion, it
would be expected that the government's support of the prayer
would coerce students to "voluntarily" join the prayer. Additionally, the Court also explicitly rejected the argument that a
prayer might be constitutionally valid if it were a "nondenominational" prayer.

B. School District of Abington v. Schempp

45

The year after Engel, the Court encountered what should
have been a very simple school praxer question, at least when
6
viewed in light of its predecessor. The facts in Abington v.
Schempp are merely superficially different from those in Engel.
Rather than composing a Regents' prayer as New York did in
Engel, the State in Abington "requir[ed] the selection and reading at the opening of the school day of verses from the Holy Bible and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer by the students in
47
unison." In other words, the State did not draft the prayer, it
selected the prayer. As stated by Justice Goldberg in his concurring opinion, "[t]hat [the State] has selected, rather than

44. Id.
45. 374 U.S. 203.
46. Id.
4 7. !d. at 223. Ironically, the prayer in Abington was significantly more religious
in the traditional sense, as the prayer belonged to an existing religion.
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written, a particular devotional liturgy seems to me to be with48
out constitutional import." The significance was that, once
again, the State required the saying of religious prayer which,
viewed in light of Engel, was clearly prohibited.
The required prayer recitation just as in Engel was also not
ameliorated by an opt out provision. The Court rejected the argument that the exercises were permissible because the stu49
dents could "absent themselves upon parental request." In re50
jecting the argument, the Court cited Engel, holding that the
Establishment Clause "is violated by the enactment of laws
which establish an official religion, whether those laws operate
51
directly to coerce non-observing individuals or not." The fact
that the government required reading the Bible, even if individuals could choose not to listen, clearly established a state official religious exercise. Just as it had in Engel, the Court rejected the notion that an Establishment Clause violation
turned on coercion.
The fact that the government required the saying of religious prayers also necessitated the rejection of the State's argument. Again focusing on the State's actions, the Court rejected the argument that prohibiting the prayer would violate
the Free Exercise rights of the majority of students who had
52
demonstrated their wish to pray. What the State's argument
ignored, and what the Court focused on, was that the students
did not demonstrate their desire to pray in class until the State
had mandated prayer. The Court noted that the Free Exercise
Clause "has never meant that a majorit~ could use the machin3
ery of the State to practice its beliefs." Again, the Court recognized that where the State requires a religious exercise, that
exercise is not an individual's exercise protected by the Free
Exercise Clause, but rather a religious practice established by
the State. The fact that a majority may consent to that establishment does not in any way lessen the violation. Indeed, a
significant purpose of the Bill of Rights is to prevent such con4
sent from being used to eliminate rights of individuals.r, The
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

!d. at 307 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
!d. at 224-25.
!d.
Engel, 370 U.S. at 430.
Abington, 374 U.S. at 225-26.
!d. at 226.
See Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1948) ("The very
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State has at least raised a valid Free Exercise question if the
State refused to prohibit students from spontaneously praying
before class and without any support or encouragement from
any employee or agent of the State. Free Exercise does not,
however, occur when the majority "consents" to the establishment of religion by the State.
In another effort to distract the Court, the State "insisted
that unless these religious exercises are permitted a 'religion of
55
secularism' is established in the schools." Instead of agreeing
with the State, the Court held that when a State requires religious exercises, it violates the First Amendment command
"that the government maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding
56
nor opposing religion." The Court's position was that the
Court does not establish a "religion of secularism" by prohibiting the State from establishing a religion.
It is frivolous to argue that the judiciary establishes a "religion of secularism" whenever it prevents a legislative or executive establishment of religion. Similarly, any effort to distinguish the facts in Abington from those in Engel would also
be mundane. The State argued that the Supreme Court erred
in Engel because it failed to consider its arguments. In particular, the argument followed that the goal in requiring prayer
was to provide moral leadership and inspiration to all children."57 In essence, the State argued that the prayer had "secular purposes," including "the promotion of moral values, the
contradiction to the materialistic trends of our times, the perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature.""s
The Court's first response was that the State had previously
59
conceded that the exercise was sectarian. Second, the Court
6
noted that The Bible is an "instrument of religion." ° Finally,
purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts."); Abington, 374 U.S. at
225 (The religious neutrality of the Religion Clauses, "does not permit a state to require religious exercises even with the consent of the majority of those affected.");
Haney v. County Bd. of Educ. of Sevier County, 410 F.2d 920, 925 (8'" Cir. 1969) ("The
very origin of the Bill of Rights draws its history from [the] early concept that even the
many must give way to certain fundamental rights of the few.").
55. Abington, 374 U.S. at 225.
56. !d.
57. !d.
58. !d. at 223.
59. !d.
60. !d. at 224.
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the religious character of the exercise is evident because as an
alternative to reading The King James Bible, the Catholic
61
Douay Version could be read. The inescapable conclusion fol62
lowed that the laws at issue "require religious exercises." Requiring religious exercises, the Court held, was clearly a
63
"breach of neutrality" under the Religion Clauses.
The Court's discussion of the State's purposes followed its
earlier discussion of the test to be applied to evaluate an Establishment Clause claim: "What is the purpose and primary effect
64
of the enactment?" The Court then restated the question in a
form which later became two-thirds of the Lemon v. Kurtzman
test, holding "that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose
and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits relig5
ion. ,G The Court failed to discuss the application of the test, or
the meaning of the words used in its test. Rather than suggest
how the test was to be applied, the Court discussed the State's
argument as to its purpose, but did not really tie the test to the
discussion.
The State argued that it had a purpose to promote values.
Rather than hold that the subjective desire of the State was irrelevant, the Court engaged in constitutional fact-finding. It
found that based on the facts surrounding the prayer, the State
66
did not, in fact, have a secular purpose.
This discussion of purpose clouded an otherwise simple
case. In both Abington and Engel the State demanded that
school children say a prayer. Perhaps looking at it in a more
favorable light due to opt-outs, it could be said that the State
chose prayer as its preferred speech. Once it had been determined that prayer was preferred speech, establishment in violation of the First Amendment was demonstrated. Engel took
this approach. While the court in Abington discussed the problem in a similar way, it diverted attention from the approach
by enveloping the discussion into its analysis of purpose. The
Court further diverted focus by its approach to the State's pur61. Id.
62. ld.
63. Id. at 225.
64. Id. at 222.
65. Id. For the first time in the context of an Establishment Clause case, the
Court uses the term "test."
66. Id. at 224.
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pose argument. Rather than hold that purpose was irrelevant
when the State adopted a policy to say a prayer, the Court determined that the State could not have had the purpose
claimed.
About a decade after Abington, the Supreme Court decided
67
Lemon v. Kurtzman, cementing into Establishment Clause ju68
risprudence the questions of purpose and effect. The Lemon
case added as part of the specific test the question of entanglement.69 Because of Lemon, the straightforward approach to the
Establishment Clause taken in Engel was abandoned by most
of the graduation prayer cases to be decided between Engel and
Lee.

III. GRADUATION PRAYER, FROM ENGEL TO LEE
A. Early Post-Engel! Pre-Lee Graduation Prayer Cases
1. Wood v. Lebanon Township School District

70

71

The first post-Engel case to review the validity of a
graduation prayer expressly distinguished Engel. It concluded
that the graduation prayer at issue did not violate the Estab72
lishment Clause. The district court made two significant distinctions from Engel and Abington. First, contrary to the implicit coercion argument articulated by the Supreme Court in
Engel and Abington, the district court held that no coercion
element was present there; that is, no one was required to attend the graduation ceremony in order to receive a diploma. In
this distinction, the district court recognized that "the Establishment Clause [may be] violated even though there is no di-

67. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 612-13.
70. Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township Sch. Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1293 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
71. In 1964, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to review the constitutionality of a religious baccalaureate program conducted by Florida Schools, but chose not to
do so for procedural reasons. Chamberlin v. Dade County, Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 377
U.S. 402 (1964).
72. Wood, 342 F. Supp. at 1293. The courts did not discuss who invited the clergy,
or what the clergy was told to say. The court simply noted that a member of the clergy,
not paid by the school, intended to give both an invocation and benediction.
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73

rect government compulsion," but nevertheless distinguished
the prayer in Engel from the graduation prayer here, by rationalizing that the Engel prayer "was thrust upon students
74
through the use of the public school system."
The lack of compulsion to attend supported the court's second distinction from Engel. The court concluded that the
graduation Rrayer was not invalid because it was not an "offi75
cial prayer." First, because no one was compelled to attend,
the ceremony was "stripped" of "any semblance of governmen76
tal establishment or condemnation." Second, the prayer was
not considered an "official prayer" because a clergy member
77
was proffering it. Finally, the court noted that at the time the
suit was filed, it was uncertain what the prayer's content would
7
be. H Therefore, if the government did not know what was to be
79
said, the government could not be the sponsor.
In support of it's finding, the district court also compared
the graduation prayer to some traditional rituals, which at
least appeared to be allowable under the Establishment
Clause. The court cited Justice Douglas's concurrence in Engel
for support, which it believed to signify approval for opening
prayers in the Supreme Court, the United States Senate, and
8
the United States House of Representatives. ° Finally, almost
73. !d. at 1295.
74. !d. While the district court did not make its point clearly, it held that Engel
was different as the students were compelled to attend classes where the "voluntary"
prayers were said. In the case under review, the students were not even compelled to
attend the ceremony.
75. !d. at 1294.
76. !d. at 1295.
77. !d.
78. !d. at 1294.
79. !d. For purposes of this paper, the logic of the analysis is not of significance.
Each of these lower court opinions is significant for the issues raised, the approaches
taken and the results given. The point of the article is to show the variety of issues
raised by prayer at graduation and how the Supreme Court ultimately ducked them.
80. !d. As it turns out, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of prayer
before the Nebraska State Legislature. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
Almost certainly the same prayer would be upheld in the United States Senate and the
United States House of Representatives. On the other hand, the transfer from legislative prayer to graduation prayer is not easily acceptable. The Supreme Court ultimately rejected such an analogy in Lee. This argument is also akin to the "ceremonial
deism" argument used in other contexts. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716
(1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted)("! would suggest that such practices
as the designation of'ln God We Trust' as our national motto, or the references to God
contained in the Pledge of Allegiance can best be understood, in Dean Rostow's apt
phrase, as a form of 'ceremonial deism,' protected from Establishment Clause scrutiny
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as an afterthought, the district court looked at the purpose of
the government's action and held that even if there were some
81
religiosity, "the ceremony to be held is primarily secular."
82

2. Wiest v. Mt. Lebanon School District

Two years later, in Wiest v. Mt. Lebanon School District, the
purpose and effect tests (the first two prongs from the Lemon
test) became the focus of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
decision upholding the constitutionality of essentially the same
83
graduation prayers in the same school district sued in Wood.
Although the court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of
the policy, no more than three justices agreed upon any one
approach. Virtually all arguments made had also been made
previously by the district court in Wood. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, as did the court in Wood, first found "that attendance at the graduation ceremonies was purely voluntary" and
that the plaintiffs would not be coerced into violating their reli84
gious beliefs. The plurality then concluded that because the
graduation was a "public ritual," "the purpose or primary effect
of the resolution providing for an invocation and benediction"
85
was not to advance religion. The court did not explain why
public religious rituals did not violate the Establishment
Clause; rather, it simply found that public rituals did not have
86
the purpose or effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.
While the plurality did not rely on Lemon, it did rely on
87
Abington. One concurrence made extensive efforts to distin88
guish Abington. The concurrence found that the graduation
chiefly because they have lost through rote repetition any significant religious content."'). Essentially, "ceremonial deism" refers to deity references made so often that the
religious meaning has been destroyed. For an interesting discussion of why "ceremonial
deism" makes no sense, see Judge Manion's concurring opinion in Sherman v. Community Canso!. Sch. Dist. 21 of Wheeling Township, 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992) (Manion,
J., concurring).
81. ld. While the court did not cite to Abington or Lemon as to the basis for considering purpose, its purpose analysis is substantially similar to that made by courts
that apply the purpose prong of the Lemon test.
82. 320 A.2d 362 (Pa. 1974).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 365.
85. Id. at 366.
86. ld. at 365-66.
87. ld. at 365.
88. Id. at 368-69 (Pomeroy, J., concurring). The other concurring opinions esse:J.tially determined that the case was not ripe because it was not certain what exactly
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prayer was constitutionally distinguishable as it was a onetime occurrence, and not part of the curriculum or the normal
9
routine of school.'~ Essentially the concurrence found that if
90
there was a violation it was of "de minim us stature" [sic].
91

3. Grossberg v. Deusebio

The third and last of the early graduation prayer cases,
Grossberg v. Deusebio, presented the first significant factual
distinction.~):< In this case, the school officials did not make the
decision to have a graduation prayer, instead the decision was
made by class representatives who acted on behalf of the senior
9
class. ' Graduating classes had made this same decision in
previous years. Furthermore, the entire cost of the graduation,
94
except the cost of the diplomas, was borne by the senior class.
As the court characterized it, the State attempted a symbolic
95
washing of hands. However, the district court rejected the
idea that school officials could purge themselves "of their responsibility."96 This responsibility was apparently tied to the
court's earlier statement oflaw: "[a] graduation ceremony for a
public school class, held on public school grounds, and administered by public school personnel, at which diplomas are officially awarded by the administration, is a public school
97
event."
Despite the facts that appear to imply that the students
could choose not to have a graduation, the court held that
98
graduations are and must be school events. The court did not
provide any evidence that the school somehow controlled the
decisions made by the students. Its rationale was that all decisions related to school events were ultimately school decisions.
would be said at graduation.
89. !d. at 369.
90. !d. AB with many of the graduation prayer cases, this opinion seemingly omits
clear delineation of purpose or effect.
91. Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285 (E. D. Va. 1974).
92. !d.
93. !d. at 287. Plainly stated, the decision of whether or not to have prayer at
graduation was not made by the school board, principal, teacher or any other person
employed by the school.
94. !d.
95. !d. at 288.
96. !d.
97. !d.
98. !d.
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Thus, students who made the decision to hold a graduation
prayer acted on behalf of or as agents for the school.
Surprisingly, after holding that the school was responsible
for the graduation, the court concluded that the prayer said at
99
graduation did not violate the Establishment Clause. The
court, although it did not specifically cite to Lemon, based its
decision on its three-pronged test. As to effect, the court was
"not convinced that the primary effect of the invocation will be
either doctrinal dissemination or a manifestation of govern100
mental affinity for religion." This conclusion was based on
the commonplace nature of invocations throughout our his101
. .
. .
. 102
t ory an d , essent·1a11y, a d e mmLmus
InJury
ana Iys1s.
As for purpose, the court looked at the purpose for having
graduation, not the purpose for having a prayer at graduation.103 Once the court viewed the question of the ceremony's
purpose, it was easy to conclude that the ceremony's primary
purpose did not advance or inhibit religion. The primary purpose of graduation is both ceremonial and to "award ... honors
104
and diplomas."
The court did not specifically discuss entanglement, but in a
conclusory manner held that the school board was not "so enmeshed in religious affairs as to warrant this Court's intervention."105 Throughout the opinion, the court downpl~ed the
06
length of the prayer, calling the time a "few moments" and a
107
"brief period." Apparently, the brevity gave the court sufficient reason to find no significant "enmeshment." While the
court did not use the language, it essentially called the violation de minimus, just as some of the state court justices did in
Wiest.
In each of these three early cases, the courts found graduation prayer constitutionally permissible. The holdings were all
based on either explicit or implicit efforts to find constitutional
significance to factual differences between graduation prayer

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
I d.
ld.
I d.
I d.
I d.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 290.
at 289.
at 289.

at 290.
at 289.
at 290.
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and a school's prayer declared invalid in Engel and Abington.
The facts that arguably make a constitutional difference are:
( 1) the government does not require attendance at graduation;
(2) graduation is a one time event; (3) prayer is not said by an
employee of the state; (4) students voted to have a graduation;
and (5) students voted to have a prayer.
These factual distinctions provided the foundation for a variety of legal arguments over the next two decades. Very few
new arguments would be made, and most would likely focus on
these factual differences. One major permutation of graduation
prayer not discussed in the very early cases is prayer offered by
108
a student.
B.

Later Post- Engel I Pre- Lee Graduation Cases

Although there were no more reported graduation prayer
cases during the 1970s, there were related cases addressing the
meshing of religion and education. For example, in 1974 the
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin enjoined
109
holding a graduation at a Roman Catholic Church. A year
earlier the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas
rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to baccalaureate
services finding that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently proven a
110
violation with their stipulation. Not until 1982, twenty years
after Engel, did a court hold that graduation prayer violated
111
the Establishment Clause.
1. Doe v. Aldine Independent School District

112

The first graduation prayer decision to specifically apply
the Lemon test was Doe v. Aldine Independent School District.
The Doe case is significantly different from most of the pre-Lee

108. Student prayer decisions are the source for many of the post-Lee high school
graduation prayer cases. See American Civil Liberties Union v. Black Horse Pike Reg'!
Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3rd Cir. 1996) (en bane); Jones v. Clear Creek lndep. Sch.
Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993); Gearon v. Loudon
County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Va. 1993).
109. Lemke v. Black, 376 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
110. Goodwin v. Cross County Sch. Dist., 394 F. Supp. 417 (E. D. Ark. 1973). Plaintiffs stipulated to the existence of baccalaureate services. While plaintiffs almost certainly assumed the court would take judicial notice of the religious nature of the services, the court instead demanded proof of what would be said. I d.
111. Doe v. Aldine Independent School District, 563 F. Supp. 883 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
112. Id.

128

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2001

graduation prayer cases because it involved singing a school
prayer at all extra-curricular school events, including graduation. Regularly, the principal, or another school official would
113
initiate the singing or recitation of the prayer.
No one was
114
required to participate. In defending the policy, the government relied on the Lemon test to argue that the prayer had
"the clear secular purpose of instilling 'in the students a sense
of school spirit or pride ... [which] has a beneficial effect on the
student body and contributes to an increase in morale, and
115
concomitantly lessens disciplinary problems'." The court, re116
lying on Justice Brennan's concurrence in Abington,
noted
that "when a non-religious purpose may be promoted throu~h
17
non-religious means, a state may not employ religious ones."
Whenever a purpose can be achieved through nonreligious
means and religious means were used, the court concluded,
that the original purgose is religious and in violation of the Es18
tablishment Clause.
This holding eliminates many governmental actions that previously have been upheld by the Supreme Court. For example, a creche or a Menorah (or other
religious symbol) could never be placed on public property pur119
suant to the lower court's holding. Indeed, this holding would
eliminate all religious art in public museums. Technically, if
the objective of a museum is to elevate the human spirit, that
objective can be achieved without displaying religious art. This
rationale, is typical of that used by the courts declaring
graduation prayer invalid. Courts cite to Justice Brennan's
Abington opinion and hold that anything able to be accomplished with a prayer could be accomplished without one.
With regard to effect, the court again followed Engel holding that "voluntariness is not relevant to a first amendment inquiry."120 The court noted that both the principal and the choir

113. Id. at 885.
114. I d. at 884-85. It is, of course, exceedingly difficult to find a case after the early
1960s in which the government has defended a government decision to directly compel
recitation of a prayer. Despite the Supreme Court's unequivocal statements in Engel
and Abington that coercion is irrelevant, governments have defended (and after Lee
continue to defend) prayer because no one is coerced into participating.
115. I d. at 886.
116. Abington, 374 U.S. at 280-281 (Brennan, J., concurring).
117. Doe, 563 F. Supp. at 886.
118. Id.
119. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
120. Doe, 563 F. Supp. at 887.
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director often initiated recitations or singing the school
121
prayer. In addition, the recitation took place at school events
on school property. These events were "an integral part of the
school's extracurricular program and as such provide a power122
ful incentive for students to attend." The combined effect of
these factors demonstrates that the impact of the school's activities "might create in a student's mind the impression that
123
the State's attitude toward religion lacks neutrality."
The
conclusion was clear to the court that the State's primary purpose was to advance religion.
In Doe v. Aldine, the court's application of the effect test
most closely parallels the Supreme Court's Engel decision. Had
it not been for Lemon, the court could have cited Engel and
concluded that the school had, based on the facts clearly demonstrated, established prayer as a State-sponsored activity. Indeed, the only factual difference between Engel and Doe was
that the "voluntary" prayer was said only during "voluntary"
activities, and in Engel the "voluntary" prayer was said during
required activities. Nothing in Engel indicates that this distinction serves any constitutional purpose.
The Court stated that the school officials' supervision over
124
the singing and praying constituted entanglement. Since the
prayer occurred on supervised school property there was excessive entanglement. In so concluding, the court relied on Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent School District125 which was overruled by Board of Education v
126
121
and more recently by Agostini v. Felton. Finally,
Mergens,
the court rejected the claims that students had Free Exercise
rights by noting that the activity was "not an independent, unofficial invocation of God's help by the students, but was rather
an initiated, encouraged, and supervised regular practice that
occurs on school property during extracurricular events as part
128
of the school's program."
121. Id.
122. !d. This approach very much mirrors the Supreme Court's discussion in Engel
of the inherent coerciveness of government-sponsored prayer. The Supreme Court's coercion discussion in Lee is also quite similar.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir.1982).
126. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
127. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
128. Doe, 563 F. Supp. at 888. This argument parallels Abington. There is no claim
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2. Graham v. Central Community School District of Decater
129
County

In Graham, a minister "conduct[ed] the invocation and
benediction" and had "complete control" over the content of the
130
messages.
While the court was not certain what would be
said, every previous benediction and invocation before the
131
court's decision had been Christian. The court assumed that
the benediction and invocation would be religious in nature.
The court nominally applied the Lemon test, and held that
the purpose of a prayer at graduation was religious because
prayer, by its nature, is religious. The court also determined
that the effect of prayer is to advance religion because the ap132
parent purpose of prayer is to advance religion. The court did
133
not consider entanglement.
34
The essential assumption made by the coure was that the
prayer belonged to the school. Once that assumption was made,
the court narrowed its focus to the prayer itself, rather than
the function of graduation. As virtually every school does in attempting to defend graduation prayer, Decater County asserted
that graduation had a laudable purpose, which the prayer as135
sisted in achieving. The court ignored this argument and answered the simple question concerning what the purpose of religious prayer really was. This became the typical approach to
the problem over the next few years.
C.

The Last Six Years Before Lee

From 1986 through 1990, nine courts reviewed graduation
136
prayers,
and the only two decisions upholding graduation
to free choice and Free Exercise after the government has already established the
prayer as preferred by the government.
129. 608 F.Supp. 531 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 535-536.
133. Id. at 536. The court also rejected the argument that the students had a Free
Exercise right to pray and that this right would be infringed upon by prohibiting
prayer at graduation.
134. This is not to suggest that the assumption was incorrect or should not have
been made.
135. Id. at 534.
136. Kay,719 P.2d at 875; Stein I, 610 F. Supp. at 43; Bennett, 238 Cal. Rptr. At
819; Lundberg, 731 F. Supp. at 331; Weisman I, 728 F. Supp. at 68; Sands I, 262 Cal.
Rptr. at 452.
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138

prayer were reversed. In the final year and a half before
139
Lee, another seven graduation prayer cases were decided. In
three out of those seven, the courts upheld the graduation
140
prayer. In Sands II, the California Supreme Court voted 5-2
with six opinions, only three of which clearly argued that
141
graduation prayer was always invalid.
In Weisman and
Weisman II, the lower courts declared graduation prayer invalid.142 In the seventh decision, the lower court held that prayer
at graduation was always invalid. Eventually, the circuit court
sent the case back for a determination of whether the graduation ceremony might be considered a limited public forum,
143
which fact might permit prayer.
While these courts disagreed over the validity of graduation
prayer, they agreed on the proper test, each applying the
Lemon test. For the most part these courts also agreed on the
proper way to apply the Lemon test. The outcomes were often
different, due to the variety of facts involved in each case. Lee
reflected one fact pattern the courts uniformly agreed was invalid. In Lee-type cases, the school, through its principal or
school board, invited a minister to give a prayer, invariably referred to as an invocation or benediction, at graduation. Nounappealed decision of any court after 1980, upheld the constitutionality of graduation prayer under those circumstances.

1. Weisman v. Lee I & II
The District Court for the District of Rhode Island, the trial
court in Lee, declared graduation prayers given by an invited
minister invalid after applying the second prong of the Lemon
144
test. The court held that the policy had an effect of advancing
145
religion.
As that finding alone invalidated the policy, the
137. Stein I, 610 F. Supp. at 43; Sands I, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
138. Stein II, 822 F.2d at 1406; Sands II, 809 P.2d at 809.
139. Sands Il, 809 P.2d at 809; Albright v. Bd.of Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist. 765 F.
Supp. 692 (D. Utah 1991); Griffin v. Teran, 794 F. Supp. 1054, (D. Kan. 1992); Jones I,
930 F.2d at 416; Weisman I, 728 F. Supp. at 98; Weisman II, 908 F.2d at 1990; Brody v.
Spang, 957 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1992).
140. Jones I, 930 F.2d at 416; Albright, 765 F. Supp. at 692; Griffin, 794 F. Supp.
at 1054.
141. Sands II, 809 P.2d at 809.
142. Weisman I, 728 F. Supp. at 98; Weisman II, 908 F.2d at 1990.
143. Brody, 957 F.2d at 1108.
144. Weisman I, 728 F. Supp. at 68.
145. Id. at 72.
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court did not consider the first or third prongs. According to the
court, "a state action advances or inhibits religion," when "the
action creates an identification of the state with a religion, or
146
with religion in general."
Without explaining its rationale,
the court simply concluded that "the benediction and invocation
advance religion by creating an identification of school with a
147
deity, and therefore religion."
Far from being a "pellucid
48
opinion" as suggested by the circuit court on review/ the district court simply determined that prayer added to school plus
an important occasion equates a "symbolic union" of church
149
and state.
The court further held that another method to
conclude whether the government creates an unconstitutional
effect is to determine whether the governmental action en150
dorses religion.
According to the court in Weisman I, the
school "in effect endorsed religion by authorizin§" an appeal to a
51
deity in public school graduation ceremonies." A prayer at
graduation conveys a preference for religion which, in effect,
endorses religion. Interestingly, at the conclusion of the opinion, the court turned back to Engel stating, "if students cannot
be led in prayer on all of those other days, prayer on gradua. d ay IS
. a Iso mappropna
.
. t e ... ,rsz
t wn
In addition to reviewing the Lemon test, the district court
rejected the defense made by the school that the prayers were
153
permissible under Marsh v. Chambers. According to the district court, "[t]he Marsh holding was narrowly limited to the
154
unique situation of legislative prayer."
This approach to
Marsh is one typically taken by those courts holding that
graduation prayer violates the Establishment Clause.
On appeal, the First Circuit adopted the trial court's opinion. One judge added a concurring opinion applying the first

146. !d. at 71.
147. !d. at 72.
148. Weisman II, 908 F.2d at 1090.
149. Weisman I, 728 F. Supp. at 72. Under this simple formulation, a moment of
silence by anyone, whether or not speaking at the ceremony, would also violate the Establishment Clause. While this is not likely what the court meant, this certainly falls
within the words used.
150. !d.
151. !d.
152. !d. at 74.
153. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
154. Weisman I, 728 F. Supp. at 74.
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155
and third prongs of the Lemon test,
and yet another dissented.156 In applying the purpose test, the concurring judge essentially held that prayer could only have a religious pur157
pose. As for entanglement, the concurring judge found that
because the school suggested the tlpe of prayer, the school en15
gaged in excessive entanglement.
2. Bennett v. Livermore Unified School Districe

59

The analysis of each part of the Lemon test in Lee I and Lee
II is similar to the analysis in prior graduation prayer cases.

Two California courts of appeal came to opposite conclusions on
the validity of graduation prayer. In Bennett v. Livermore Unified School District, the court provided a superficial analysis of
Lemon and graduation prayer. To the court, quite simp~, "the
10
primary purpose of a religious invocation is religious." Both
the purpose and effect of the court's analysis were essentially
tautological, e.g., "[t]he practice of including a religious invocation in a graduation ceremony conveys a message of endorsement of the particular creed represented in the invocation, and
161
of religion in general." Per the issue of entanglement, the
court attacks a common problem with graduation prayers. As
in
Lee,
school
officials
would
allow
prayer/invocations/benedictions only if they were nonsectarian. In order to prevent sectarian prayers, the school had
to monitor these prayers, thereb~i according to the court, en1
tangling the school with religion.
In Bennett, the decision to include a religious invocation
163
was made by the high school's graduation committee. To the
Bennett court, how the prayer came to be included in the cere155. Weisman II, 908 F. 2d at 1094-1095 (Bownes, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 1097 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 1095 (Bownes, J., concurring). This approach is typical. A prayer has
obvious religious purpose. Once the judge looks to the "effect" of prayer, it is virtually
inevitable that the judge would conclude that the effect is religious.
158. Id.
159. 238 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1987).
160. I d. at 823.
161. I d. at 823-824.
162. I d. The school admitted and the court agreed that if any prayer were allowed,
it would be "necessary to oversee the student's choice of ceremony to ensure" that the
ceremony remained nonsectarian.
163. I d. at 821. The makeup of the committee is not clear. However, from the way
the opinion is written, it appears to be a committee of students.
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mony was irrelevant. The court found the ceremony to be an
164
"administrative act" as a matter of fact and law. It easily followed from this finding that the marriage of religion and an
administrative act violated the Establishment Clause.

3. Sands v. Morongo Unified School District (Sands 1)

165

In the second California case, Sands I, a number of different methods for selecting speakers was at issue. In one case the
class president selected the speakers, but the principal made
the final decision. In another, a student committee selected the
166
speakers.
Before applying the Lemon test, the court noted
the widely divergent results in graduation prayer cases.
As to purpose, the Sands I court disagreed with the Bennett
court's tautological conclusion that prayer is religious and
therefore the purpose is religious. The court noted that "to
'[f]ocus exclusively on the religious component of any activity
167
would inevitably lead to its invalidation ... "'
The correct question, the court asserted, is "whether the re168
ligious activity is being used for a secular purpose." A secular
purpose need not be exclusive and can be joined with a reli169
gious purpose. The proper view of a graduation prayer is in
the context ofthe~aduation ceremony, the purpose ofwhich is
1
"wholly secular." This, the court implied, is analogous to the
171
Supreme Court's decision in County of Allegheny where the
Supreme Court looked at the "context" of the religious symbols
on public property to determine whether their presence vio172
lated the Establishment Clause. The invocation in context of
173
the entire ceremony simply "sets a formal or solemn tone."
The conclusion was that the prayer, therefore, served a secular

164. ld.
165. 262 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1989).
166. Id. at 454-55.
167. !d. at 459 (quoting from Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984)).
168. !d.
169. ld.
170. !d.
171. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
172. It is interesting to note how similar this context "test" is to the obscenity test
in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), wherein the court suggests that the question
as to whether a work is obscene is not the import of a passage or photo taken out of
context but the work "taken as a whole."
173. Sands I, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
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174
purpose of adding "dignity and decorum."
As to effect, the Sands I court again considered the prayer
in context. The effect of the prayer mirrored the purpose. The
effect was to "set a solemn tone" and any religious effect was
175
"remote and incidental." Important to the court was that the
graduation prayer was a one-time occurrence. It "did not concur in a 'repetitive or pedagogical context ' and was not part of
176
a program of 'calculated indoctrination'." The court based its
conclusion of such excessive governmental entanglement on essentially these same factors.
Curiously, the court concluded its Establishment Clause
analysis by "emphasiz[ing] that we find onl~ nonsectarian in77
The court provocations and benedictions constitutional."
vided no clarification as to why the statement was accurate or
made sense. There is little logic to holding that "prayer" which
offends the atheist is valid but that prayer that offends a per178
son of another sect is not.

4. Sands v. Morongo Unified School District (Sands 11)

179

Sands II reversed Sands I. In Sands II, the California Supreme Court essentially agreed with the lower court, holding
that a state must be "certain" that no one "advance the religious mission of his or her churches in the public school setting."180 Interestingly enough, the court of appeals' requirement, with which the California Supreme Court agreed,
provided part of the basis for the California Supreme Court's
decision to reverse Sands I. The court in Sands II reasoned
that the only way to assure that a prayer is acceptable, i.e.,
nonsectarian, would be for the government/school to evaluate

174. Id.
175. I d. at 461.
176. Id. (quoting from Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. at 288-89 (E.D. Va.
1974)). While not expressly distinguishing graduation prayer from school prayer in
Engel, the court is, in effect, making that distinction.
177. Id.
178. In spirit, this holding is akin to the Bennett holding that even if prayer were
allowed, entanglement would follow in order to keep the prayer from favoring one sect.
179. 809 P. 2d 809 (1991).
180. Id. at 818 (quoting from Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 410-11 (internal quotations omitted)). The court softened this overly broad statement, implying, by reference to the Supreme Court's decision in Bd. of Educ. of Westside Community Schs. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990), that it may be permissible under some circumstances for
students to advance a religious mission among each other.
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181

the content of admittedly religious speech. This monitoring
was precisely the type of entanglement prohibited by the Establishment Clause. "To allow preventive monitoring by the
state of the content of religious speech inevitably leads to grad182
ual official development of what is acceptable public prayer."
The California Supreme Court thus concluded that the graduation prayers at issue violated the entanglement prong of the
183
Lemon test.
The Sands II court also held that the graduation prayers
184
violated the effect prong of the Lemon test. This conclusion
185
was based upon the fact that graduation is a school event.
The court stated that "when a religious invocation is given via
a sound system controlled by school principals and the religious
invocation occurs at a school-sponsored event at a school-owned
facility, the conclusion is inescapable that the religious invocation conveys a message that the school endorses the religious
186
invocation." According to the opinion, "inclusion of graduation prayers in an official ceremony" signifies approval of both
"the practice of prayer and the prayer's religious content. The
187
message of sponsorship is unavoidable."
Put another way,
prayer at lraduation "produces a 'symbolic union' of state and
1
religion."
Again, graduation plus prayer equals Establishment Clause violation. According to the court, the conclusion is
inescapable that prayer at graduation has the effect of advancing religion and therefore violates the second prong of the
Lemon test.
The plurality's analysis of the Lemon test does not rely on
the school's promotion of the religious ceremonies. Instead, the
plurality's opinion is in the passive tense. Without stating who
was responsible for the prayers being said at graduation, the
court stated that the effect of prayer plus graduation violates
the Establishment Clause. This approach can be distinguished
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Again, this is a typical but illogical approach. Prayer is prayer whether it specifically is sectarian or not.
184. Sands II, 809 P.2d at 813.
185. Id. at 814-15.
186. ld. at 815 (quoting from Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824,
831, cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1090 (1989)).
187. ld. at 814 n. 5.
188. Id. at 815 (quoting from Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 392
(1985)).
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from the plurality's rejection of the State's argument that it
. re1"1g10n.
. 189
was mere1y accommo d a t mg
The plurality noted, "[t]here is no free exercise right for
government officials to include prayers in a public school ceremony."190 The plurality distinguished student speech recognizing that "in this case school officials do promote, lead, and par191
ticipate in the religious ceremonies ... "
The government
officials, as the plurality notes, were active participants in
assuring the presence of prayer. Prayer did not find its way
into the ceremonies all by itself. Although the plurality's
discussion of the Lemon test does not in anyway make this
clear, the question of whether graduation could be or is a public
forum was explicitly discussed.
5. Lundberg v. West Monona Community School Districe

92

For reasons similar to those given by both the Sands II plurality and the Weisman I and II courts, the federal district
court, in Lundberg v. West Monona Community School District,
rejected a claim that a school board should be required to allow
193
a minister to speak at graduation. The Lundberg court held
that allowing an invocation or benediction would violate the
purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon test. Therefore, the
court would not order the school board to allow a minister to
194
give a prayer. The significance of Lundberg lies not in the
court's decision, but in the arguments raised by the plaintiffs.
The students in Lundberg argued that graduation is a public
forum and therefore the government could not discriminate
195
against religious speech. While not using the term, the court
essentially found graduation to be a type of non-public forum
where "speech is subject to the greatest amount of government
196
restrictions." Relying on Hazelwood School District v. Kuhl197
meier, the court concluded that the school had simply and

189. The plurality also rejected the state's argument based on Marsh v. Chambers.
See Sands II, 809 P.2d at 819-20.
190. Sands II, 809 P.2d at 816.
191. ld. at n.7.
192. 731 F. Supp. 331 (N.D. Iowa 1989).
193. ld.
194. ld. at 342-45.
195. I d. at 336.
196. ld. at 337.
197. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). The Supreme Court found that a school did not possess
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validly "banned certain subject matter from graduation ceremonies (i.e., religion) believing such a subject is inappropriate
. 'ty. ,198
a t a sc h oo l ac t IVI
As to whether the school could create a public forum
wherein religious speech would be permissible, the court was
contradictory. The court held "that while the school could have,
it did not create the graduation ceremony 'for the purpose of
199
providing a forum for expressive activity'." The court noted
earlier that graduation prayer must always be a non-public forum. While the court did not use the word "always," its rationale at first blush appears to indicate such:
The court finds that a high school graduation ceremony falls
within the third forum, that in which the public's right to free
speech is subject to the greatest amount of government restrictions. The evidence at the hearing established that the
West Monona Community School District organizes, authorizes, and sponsors the Onawa High School commencement
program. The event is conducted on school property using
school facilities, which event school employees carry out. The
school sets the program for the commencement ceremony,
having the sole discretion to dictate its content. While the
school cannot dictate the actual words spoken, the school does
retain control over the type of speech admissible at the cere2oo
mony.

The court then concluded: "It is altogether fitting and
proper that the school have the power to control what occurs at
.
,201
. of 1'ts semors.
a gra d ua t wn
While these comments appear to foreclose the possibility of
the creation of a public forum at graduation, they must be
taken in the context of the case presented. The plaintiffs in
Lundberg were comprised of students and a minister who were
asking the court "to force the School Board to provide a stage
upon which plaintiffs may express their views concerning relig-

all the attributes of a traditional public forum. For example, the school did not violate
the First Amendment by its failure to print two pages in the school newspaper that included the names of two students involved in a controversial issue. It was not unreasonable because of the need to protect the privacy of the individuals in the article. ld.
198. Lundberg, 731 F. Supp. at 338.
199. Id. at 337 (quoting Correlius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473
u.s. 778, 805C1985n.
200. !d. at 337.
201. Id.

111]

FUTURE OF SCHOOL GRADUATION PRAYER

139

202

ion." In light of the law concerning a public forum, it is certainly an unremarkable conclusion that a school (the state)
203
cannot be required to create a public forum. The court's conclusion that a school ceremony is not a public forum unless the
204
school wants it to be is also unremarkable.
The Lundberg case is interesting, however, because of the
plaintiffs efforts to prove the existence of a public forum and
because of the court's conclusion. As mentioned, the court appears to conclude that a public forum could be created, but then
uses words that appear to foreclose the possibility. Also, the
court assumed without any significant discussion that "[e]ven if
the court were to hold that a high school graduation ceremony
constitutes a public forum, the School Board would still have
the right to ban prayer at the graduation ceremony because it
has a compelling state interest in not violating the Establish205
ment Clause of the First Amendment." The idea that the
government can easily and at any time prohibit religious
206
speech at a public forum has been soundly rejected. The court
secondly concludes that if permitted, the speech which ~lain
07
tiffs claim a right to exercise would be school-sponsored." Although this conclusion has not been soundly rejected, it does
appear to prohibit any effort to show how one graduation might
be different from another. This is also shown by the court's
third conclusion, "[g]raduation ceremonies have never served
as forums for public debate or discussions, or as a forum
through which to allow varying groups to voice their views.
Schools hold graduation ceremonies for the very limited secular
208
purposes-to congratulate graduates of the high school."
These conclusions demonstrate that the court found that all
graduations are indistinguishable. In sum, the court held that
schools could possibly create a public forum at graduation but

202. Id. at 339 (footnote omitted).
203. See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998)
("The government does not create a [designated] public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse ... ").
204. Id.
205. Lundberg, 731 F. Supp. at 339 n.8.
206. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819
(1995). This is not to say that the State may not ever have grounds to reject religious
speech in a public forum. It cannot be simply concluded that religious speech may be
rejected because of the fear of an Establishment Clause violation.
207. Lundberg, 731 F. Supp. at 339 n.7.
208. Id. at 339.
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that all graduations are the same. The court added that the
Lundberg graduation was not a public forum, so it can be concluded that graduations can never be public forums. These
holdings were all made under circumstances when it was clear
that the school did not want to nor attempt to grant students
(or any one else) a freedom to speak. As it turned out,
Lundberg dealt only very superficially with the Establishment
Clause.
6. Griffith v. Teran

209

The question of student speech and the creation (or not) of a
forum in relation to the Establishment Clause was more seriously considered in those cases where the school did grant
speech rights to students.
210
For example, in Griffith v Teran, students were selected
to speak at graduation by school officials from "a diverse crosssection of the student body" and "without regard to religious
211
beliefs or preferences." The court did not clearly explain how
students were selected, but those selected were "counseled only
to speak in non-sectarian, non-doctrinal, and non-proselytizing
212
terms." Furthermore, an atheistic or agnostic point of view
would "be consistent with the purpose of these portions of the
213
graduation program."
The court found this program to be
consistent with all three prongs of the Lemon test: (1) The purpose of the invocations was to solemnize the occasion; (2) The
primary effect of these invocations is not to endorse religion,
because invocations at public ceremonies have "passed into 'the
214
American civil religion';" and (3) There is no "excessive entanglement," where the students composed the prayer subject
only to a review by the principal for sectarianism or proselytization."215
As to the purpose prong, the court focused on the purpose of
the invocation and not the graduation ceremony. However, as
to purpose, the court emphasized one of the most confusing as-

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

794 F.Supp. 1054 (D. Kan. 1992).

!d.
Id. at 1055.
Id.
Id. at 1056.
I d. at 1059, (quoting Stein II, 822 F.2d at 1409).
Jd.
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216
pects of the Lemon purpose prong.
"The first prong of the
Lemon test ... requires that state action have 'a' secular gur27
pose. It does not require that the purpose be only secular."
In this case it was easy for the court to conclude that a
218
secular purpose of the prayer was to solemnize the occasion.
As to effect, the court[ without citing it, essentially followed
2 9
its reasoning in Marsh.
The court found that non-sectarian
prayer under certain circumstances is so entrenched in the nation's history as to have become part of a civil religion of "cere220
monial deism." The court refused to enjoin the graduation
prayer.
7. Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools (I and II/
222
In Stein I,
the district court applied the Lemon test, and
223
in Stein //
the circuit court applied the Marsh test. The
graduation ceremonies at issue varied with the schools. The
students in some schools selected a minister to give an invocation and benediction. While these speeches were not reviewed,
the minister was instructed to keep them "nondenominational."224 In other schools, students were selected to give both
commencement addresses and the invocation and benediction.
However, the "administration in no way attempt[ed] to monitor
225
the content of [the student] presentation." As for the student
messages, the district court applied Lemon and held that the
secular purpose for the speeches was to "provide some form of
226
solemn opening and closing" for graduation. The second purpose was to permit the students to plan or ~articipate in the
22
ceremonies without control by the school.
The court then
21

216. As these courts demonstrate, "purpose" is confusing in the first place as to
what to focus on.
217. Griffith, 794 F. Supp. at 1058-59 (citation omitted).
218. Id. at 1059. Prayer invariably has a religious purpose. See Karen B. v. Treen,
653 F. 2d 897 (5th Cir. 1981). By the same token, prayer could almost always be found
to have some higher secular purpose.
219. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
220. ld. The court's entanglement discussion was a one sentence conclusion.
221. Stein I, 610 F. Supp. at 43; Stein II, 822 F.2d at 1406.
222. Stein I, 610 F. Supp. at 43.
223. Stein II, 822 F.2d at 1406.
224. Stein I, 610 F. Supp. at 45.
225. Id.
226. I d. at 48.
227. Id.
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gave six reasons why there was no unconstitutional effect: (1)
graduation is voluntary; (2) "the school itself is not composing a
228
prayer;" (3) there is no daily indoctrination; (4) the audience
is older; (5) graduation is not part of the educational program;
229
and (6) the speakers do not proselytize. The court found that
there was no entanglement because this was a once a year pro23o
gram.
The circuit court of appeals reversed, holding that the
Marsh test, not the Lemon test was appropriate. The court remanded the case for the district court to enter an order requiring that the invocations be nonsectarian and non231
proselytizing.
Only if that were true could the prayers be
232
"'civil' invocations or benedictions" or be part of "the American civil religion" which the court in Stein II found to be ap233
proved in Marsh v. Chambers. According to the circuit court,
graduation prayers would be permissible as long as they were
non -denominationa I.
34

8. Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School Districe

235

The most important pre-Lee case was Jones I,
in which
the Clear Creek Independent School District adopted the following policy:
1. The use of an invocation and/or benediction at high school
graduation exercise shall rest with the discretion of the
graduating senior class, with the advice and counsel of the
senior class principal; 2. The invocation and benediction, if
used, shall be given by a student volunteer; and 3. Consistent
with the principle of equal liberty of conscience, the invocation and benediction shall be nonsectarian and nonproselytiz228. ld. at 49.
229. Id. at 49-50.
230. /d. at 50.
231. Stein II, 822 F.2d at 1410.
232. Id.
233. ld. at 1409.
234. 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991). Here, graduating seniors and parents brought
suit against the school district to enjoin them from permitting invocations and benedictions at a high school graduation ceremony. The Supreme Court ultimately remanded
to the 5th Circuit.
235. /d. at 417. As will be discussed later, its importance lies in the fact that it was
also the first graduation prayer case to be reviewed after Lee. Because the Fifth Circuit
upheld the constitutionality of student-led prayer after the Supreme Court's decision in
Lee, it caused graduation prayer policies and cases to focus on the "student prayer" or
"voluntary prayer" approach.
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. .
236
mgm nature.
Applying Lemon, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
the constitutionality of this policy.
As to purpose, the court held that the secular purpose of the
237
prayer was to solemnize the graduation ceremonies.
In so
holding, the court relied on and quoted from Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion in Lynch, that "'government acknowledgments of religion serve, in the only ways reasonably possible in
our culture, the legitimate secular purpose of solemnizing pub238
lic occasions'."
Beyond holding that a prayer has a secular purpose at
graduation, the circuit court found that prayer was the only
way to accomplish the secular purpose of solemnization:
But to say that the Resolution employs a 'religious means' is
to confuse purpose and effect analysis under Lemon. Unlike
the laws at issue in Lubbock and Treen, the resolution takes
no position on whether a proposed invocation references a deity, and only seeks to limit sectarianism and proselytization.
The Resolution does not employ an obviously religious means
to solemnize Clear Creek graduation ceremonies. Moreover,
we are unaware of an exclusively secular equivalent for Clear
239
Creek's solemnization choice (emphasis added).

Before reviewing the purpose of the policy, the court held
that the jolicy need not have had "exclusively secular objective[s]."24 A purpose is invalid, the court held, only if a policX
21
had no secular purpose or the purpose suggested is a sham.
Given that the court had held that prayer was essential to the
accomplishment of the solemnization purpose, the court easily
found the policy to be valid under its understanding of the
242
Lemon purpose prong.
As to the effect prong, the court "focus[ed] on an invoca243
tion's effect in the context of an entire graduation ceremony."
236. Id.
237. ld. at 420.
238. Id. at 420 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
239. ld.
240. I d. at 419.
241. Id. at n.2.
242. Once again, this court's approach demonstrates the difficulty of the Lemon
test. This court looked to the "purpose" of the policy. This is slightly different than the
purpose of the prayer or the purpose of the graduation.
243. Jones I, 930 F.2d at 421 n.161 (related to the Miller obscenity test). This con-
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The context, much the same "context" relied upon in Stein I,
was: (1) the invocation was brief; (2) the invocation was only
once in four years; (3) the invocation audience was older and
included parents; (4) the invocation was denominatively neutral; and (5) the state action was "passive," merely "facilitating"
244
the invocation.
The court used the passive nature of the
schools involvement to distinguish the Clear Creek pra~er at
45
graduation from the school prayer prohibited in Engel.
According to the circuit court, Clear Creek "facilitates invocations,
but it leaves their existence and reference to a deity, to the dis246
cretion of each graduating class and student volunteer." The
circuit court emphasized that the effects question focused on
what the "government itself [does] through its own activities
247
and influence."
The circuit court also found no entanglement. First, the
ceremony occurs only once and consequently, the school does
248
not continuously oversee secular activities. Second, the policy
excluded sectarian speeches, which eliminated any entanglement with religious organizations. Entanglement was, accord249
ing to the court, "impossible."
The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah followed
Jones I in Albright v. Board of Education of Granite School District.250 The actual decision denying a preliminary injunction
involved the Alpine School District.
The policy of the District [was] to permit prayer on a voluntary, non-discriminatory basis, at the request of the graduating class, with 'participating students selected on the basis of
scholastic achievement, without regard to religious affiliation,
preference or belief. Such students [were] counseled only to
speak in non sectarian, non doctrinal and non proselytizing

text approach is also similar to that taken in the creche cases. See County of Allegheny
v. American Civil Liberties Union 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984).
244. Jones, 930 F.2d at 422.
245. Id.
246. ld.
247. Id. (quoting from Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
248. ld. at 422-23. Furthermore, any oversight and review that occurred, would
occur prior to the graduation ceremony. At the time of the ceremony, no such oversight
occurred or could occur.
249. ld. at 423.
250. 765 F. Supp. 682, 684 (D. Utah 1991).
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145

251

The court noted that the facts in Jones I were "similar" and
followed the reasoning in Jones I with regard to the application
252
of the Lemon test.
The district court in Albright also looked to Marsh in up253
holding the validity of the policy. Indeed, the court predicted
that the Supreme Court would apply Marsh to graduation
254
prayer and uphold its validity.
The district court consequently upheld the prayer at issue under what it termed the
255
"Ceremonial Occasion Exception."
Finally, the court noted
the importance of the fact that the student's speeches were not
.
d an d mom"t ore d .256
rev1ewe
U7

9. Brody v. Spang

.

UB

and Gmdry v. Broussard

The last two Lee graduation prayer cases of interest are
Brody v. Spang and Guidry v. Broussard. Brody is significant
not for the court's decision on prayer, but for its lengthy discussion of creating a public forum at graduation. Likewise, Guidry
is not important for the specific result, but for the question
raised by the plaintiff.
In Brody, the plaintiffs filed suit against Dowington High
School alleging that "inclusion of religious benedictions and invocations at graduation ceremonies" violated the Establishment Clause. The court does not clearly state who gave the
prayers or under whose direction or guidance. The school immediately settled the case the day it was filed. The settlement
included the following restriction:
251. !d. at 684 (footnote omitted).
252. !d. at 688.
253. See e.g., Albright, 765 F. Supp. 682.
254. !d. at 689.
255. !d. at 688-89. The district court rejected the argument that the "ceremonial
occasion exception" was limited to legislative prayer.
256. Albright, 765 F. Supp. at 688-89. This court also found it to be of constitutional significance that the prayer was directed to be nonsectarian and nonproselytizing. This court, like others, essentially found that excluding atheists was constitutionally valid, but that a sectarian prayer, which excludes atheists and those with other
beliefs might be invalid.
257. 957 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1992).
258. 897 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1990).
259. Brody, 957 F.2d at 1111. The court's use of the phrase "inclusion of religious
benedictions," is typical. The passive language merely says that prayers were given at
graduation. The phrase does not say how the prayers were solicited for graduation. It
eliminates responsibility and notes only existence. !d.
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Defendants, their successors, agents, employees and those
acting by their invitation shall not pray, proselytize with respect to religion, or engage in any religious ceremony or activity during the annual commencement exercises or any other
official event at the Dowington Senior High School. Except
with respect to students invited to speak at graduation, nothing in this agreement shall be interpreted to restrict any stu260
dent's first amendment rights.

As the court noted later, this restriction, on its face, prohibited students who were invited to speak at graduation from
speaking in religious terms, even if such prohibition limited
261
these students' First Amendment rights. In response to this
order, another group of students sought to intervene in order to
protect the First Amendment rights of student speakers at
graduation.
262
The intervening students argued that graduation was a
public forum, and consequently that those students who the
school invited to speak could not be prohibited from giving religious speeches. The court gave reasons why it thought that
graduation could not be a public forum. Interestingly, the court
then remanded the case for a determination of whether the
school created a public forum after expressly holding that it
was at least possible for a school to make graduation a public
263
forum.
If, for example, school officials have authorized students to
choose which of them will speak, and have permitted these
speakers to select their own topics, including controversial
subject matters, then officials may have created a limited
public forum. Not only would such a practice demonstrate an
intent to foster public discourse, but it would also avoid attaching the imprimaturs of the school to the views expressed
. stud ents ' speec h es. 264
m

The court essentially took the standards for determining
what makes a public forum and applied them specifically to
graduation.
260. Id. at 1112 n.2.
261. Id. at 1117 ("[T]his consent decree provision, on its face, clearly permits an
infringement of otherwise existing First Amendment rights of students.").
262. These students were not granted the right to intervene by the district court,
and the circuit court remanded the case for a determination whether intervention
should be granted. For the purpose of this discussion, these students were intervenors.
263. Brody, 957 F.2d at 1120.
264. Id.
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The court's analysis of the forum question revolved around
demonstrating (1) the intent of the school and (2) "the extent of
265
the use" of the forum granted. These issues were to be considered in light of, and not to be determined by, the persons allowed to speak. The school could create a limited public forum
by limiting "the pool of potential graduation speakers" to a
small group of people such as "members of the school community" and granting "'indiscriminate use'" of the forum to that
266
limited pool. This discussion is premised on the principle that
student speech and school speech is not the same.
This distinction also provided the basis of the plaintiffs
267
claims in Guidry. Guidry was valedictorian of her high school
and as such had the right to speak at her graduation. She
wanted to give a religious speech, but the principal forbade it.
She claimed that her First Amendment rights were violated.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the case for
mootness and thereby avoided the constitutional questions.
The holding, analysis, and rationale of Guidry are of no
268
particular significance.
However, this case highlights the
vast factual differences in the graduation prayer cases. They
run from the valedictorian, who is invited to speak but prohib269
ited from praying, to the school principal, who invites a rabbi
270
to give a prayer but only a particular kind of prayer. At the
same time, the plaintiff in Guidry presents, as perhaps no
other plaintiff does, the contrast between the desires of a private citizen, who has at least a qualified right to speak at
graduation, and the school. This highlights the argument that
private speech and government speech are not the same.
IV. POST LEE ISSUES

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both Lee v. Weis265. Id. at 1117.
266. ld. at 1120, (quoting Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988)).
267. Guidry, 897 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1990).
268. Guidry is one of several graduation prayer cases in which the court dismissed
the case for mootness or standing. See also Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d
1475 (11th Cir. 1997); Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999);
Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 821 F. Supp. 638 (D. Idaho 1993) affd in part, reu'd
in part, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, judgment vacated by Joint Sch. Dist.
No. 241 v. Harris, 515 U.S. 1154 (1995).
269. Guidry, 897 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1990).
270. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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271

272

man and Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District.
In Lee, the Court ruled that the graduation prayers at issue
violated the Establishment Clause. Rather than ruling on the
merits in Jones, the Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's order in
273
light of Lee. However, having granted certiorari in both cases
the court could have answered many, if not most, of the questions raised by lower courts in the prior two decades. Instead,
the Court reviewed the easiest factual question and answered
it in a fashion that provided few answers for the questions
raised by the courts below. In addition to leaving questions
open, the Court raised questions that had not been raised before.
A. The Choice: The Lemon Analysis or the Marsh Analysis
274

In one of the earliest cases, Stein II was the only court
that did not consider the constitutionality of prayer at gradua75
tion pursuant to the either Lemon tese or at least two prongs
276
therein; instead, it chose to apply Marsh.
The circuit court in Stein II held that Marsh permitted the
existence of a civil religion where (1) the religion was nonsec277
tarian, and nonproselytizing and (2) the practice is rooted in
278
common practice, tradition or history. However, the Supreme
Court expressly rejected the application of Marsh to high school
.
279
grad ua t Ions.
In so doing the Court opened the door for arguing that government-created prayer is constitutional "where adults are free
to enter and leave with little comment and for any number of

271. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
272. 505 U.S. 1215 (1992).
273. Id.
274. Wood, 342 F. Supp. 1293 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
275. Weisman I, 728 F. Supp. at 68; Weisman II, 908 F.2d at 1090; Sands I, 262
Cal. Rptr. at 452; Sands II, 809 P.2d at 809; Albright, 765 F. Supp. at 682; Bennett, 193
Cal. App. 3d at 1012; Doe, 563 F. Supp. at 883; Graham, 608 F. Supp. at 531; Griffith,
794 F. Supp. at 1054; Jones, 505 U.S. at 1215; Kay, 719 P.2d at 875; Lundberg, 731 F.
Supp. at 331; Stein I, 610 F. Supp. at 43.
276. Wiest, 320 A.2d at 362; Grossberg, 380 F. Supp. at 285. As discussed earlier,
these cases did not mention Lemon but relied on two parts of the Lemon test.
277. Id. at 1409.
278. Id. at 1408-09. While the circuit court did not expressly refer to common practice, it did note the existence of prayer at "thousands of public graduation exercises annually."
279. Lee, 505 U.S. at 597.
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reasons."
The Court emphasized this distinction between
281
adults and children throughout the rest of the opinion. For
example, the Court did "not address" the question of whether
the choices given to primary and secondary school children under the facts presented would be "acceptable if the affected citi282
zens [were] mature adults." The Court also noted "that adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from their peers
283
toward conformity."
While the Court expressly rejected Marsh, at least as to
high school graduations, it did not expressly rely on Lemon,
therebsY inviting immediate suggestions that Lemon was
2 4
dead. Failure to rely on Lemon was particularly interesting
in the Lee case. Because almost every lower court had applied
it, the Court clearly had a foundation from which to apply the
Lemon test in its own fashion. More than one court had found
that graduation prayers, similar to those reviewed in Lee, violated each part of the Lemon test. Finally, Justice Blackmun,
in concurrence, essentially applied the effect prong of the
285
Lemon test.
Having rejected Marsh and ignored Lemon, the Court could
286
have turned to Engel or Abington, or both, but it did not.
While the Court did not ignore its school prayer cases, it did
not use them as the cases that created the appropriate Establishment Clause test. Instead, the Court used a coercion test.
Throughout its opinion, the Court emphasized that the plaintiff
287
was coerced, forced, or pressured into joining in the prayer.

280. !d.
281. !d. at 593.
282. !d.
283. !d.
284. Lee, 505 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court today demonstrates
the irrelevance of Lemon by essentially ignoring it ... and the interment of that case
may be the one happy by-product of the Court's otherwise lamentable decision."). As it
turns out, not only was Scalia's prediction of interment premature, he was one of five
votes to give Justice O'Connor the majority needed to resurrect/rewrite the Lemon test
in Agostini v. Felton 521 U.S. 203 (1997). Of course, given Lemon's checkered past, this
too, may be at best temporary.
285. !d. at 603-604 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
286. How those cases, Engel in particular, may have aided the Court is discussed
later.
287. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587, 592-595, 597.
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B. Voluntariness
In finding coercion, the court rejected the argument based
upon voluntary attendance made in and accepted by a number
288
of courts in pre-Lee graduation prayer cases.
The Supreme
Court rejected the idea ofvoluntariness holding that peer pres289
sure made attendance essentially mandatory.
The Court
held:
[a]ttendance may not be required by official decree, yet it is
apparent that a student is not free to absent herself from the
graduation exercise in any real sense of the term "voluntary,"
for absence would require forfeiture of those intangible benefits which have motivated the student through her youth and
290
all her high school years.
Because students were "forced" to be at graduation, the
Court easily concluded that they were "forced" to be part of,
291
and subjected to, religious activities.
In Lee, the school argued that even if this was a technical
violation, the courts should not prohibit graduation prayer be292
cause the violation was de minimis. Similarly, lower courts
had argued that the prayer was valid because of the context of
293
graduation. Some courts had noted that the prayer was only
294
a few minutes of an entire ceremony,
and graduation oc295
curred only once per year. The Court, while not discussing

288. Grossberg, 380 F. Supp. 285; Wiest, 320 A.2d 362; Wood, 342 F. Supp. 1293.
289. Lee, 505 U.S. at 594-95.
290. ld. at 595. This conclusion is founded on the irrefutable "[e]veryone
knows ... " Id. According to the Court, what "[e]veryone knows" is that "high school
graduation is one of life's most significant occasions." Presumably this is not accurate
for the millions of people who do not graduate from high school, nor is it likely to be
true for those students who skip high school graduation. This finding takes judicial notice to a new level. The Court found as fact that all people feel the same way about a
general event. Presumably, the Court can also make assumptions (i.e., findings) about
people's views toward birth, marriage, and death. Indeed, the Court does make those
kind of assumptions. Perhaps what is most incredible about the Court's finding is its
prefatory phrase "everyone knows." Not only is the phrase incredibly informal, it implies weakness. It is almost a personal attack on those who would dare disagree. The
only thing missing explicitly (and almost in the opinion implicitly) is: "[djon't you know
anything, everyone knows ... " Id.
291. ld. at 593, 596.
292. ld. at 594.
293. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416, 421 (5th Cir. 1991) vacated and remanded, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992).
294. Stein I, 610 F. Supp. 43, 49.
295. Id.
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each of these arguments, clearly dismissed them saying, "[t]he
embarrassment and intrusion of the religious exercise cannot
be refuted by ar~uing that these prayers ... are of a de mini29
mis character."
C. Ceremonial Deism

Lower courts have also argued that prayer is not prayer
297
if it is part of our "civic religion." Under this argument, a
prayer becomes acceptable if it is rendered so often that it loses
its religious connotations. Courts proffered the phrase, "In God
We Trust," as well as the opening prayer before the courts, to
298
support their thinking. One of the requirements for inclusion
in the civic religion, however, is that the prayer be nonsectar299
ian and non proselytizing. The Lemon test encouraged these
holdings. The courts held that the purpose and effect of these
prayers was not to advance religion because they were not advancing "a" religion. The prayers were simply setting a solemn
or respectful tone.
300
The Lee Court rejected the ceremonial deism argument.
To suggest that the prayers had no religious meaning the Court
held, "would be an affront to the rabbi who offered them and to
all those for whom the prayers were an essential and profound
301
recognition of divine authority."
The Court even turned
around the suggestion that nonsectarian prayer might be more
acceptable. The Court said that while the number of persons
offended or injured by nonsectarian prayer might be fewer, for
some "their sense of isolation and affront" might actually increase.302 A prayer, then, is a prayer, whether it is short or long
or whether it is sectarian or nonsectarian. At best, this conclusion held true in Lee.

296. Lee, 505 U.S. at 594.
297. This "civic religion" has been used in one court to uphold saying the Pledge of
Allegiance in school.
298. See County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 602
(1989).
299. !d.
300. !d. Various justices have argued in favor of the validity of ceremonial deism in
other contexts.
301. Lee, 505 US. at 594.
302. !d.
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D. Coercion
In declaring the graduation prayer to be unconstitutionalj
30
the Court in Lee emphasized the narrowness of its decision.
Although the Court found that tremendous social coercion often
"requires" high school students to attend graduation ceremo304
nies, the Court conceded that adults might be different. The
Court's express notation of this distinction invites arguments
that the distinction makes a constitutional difference. This is
particularly true due to the Court's conclusion that the social
coercion of the high school students to join religious activities is
why those state-sponsored religious activities are invalid. The
argument to be made is that state sponsored religious activities
305
are acceptable where people are not coerced to conform.
The irony of this coercion distinction is that no court that
considered graduation prayer prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lee had held that prayers were acceptable because
306
they were voluntary. Indeed, they cited to Engel or Abington
for the proposition that voluntariness was irrelevant. Consequently, the Court reinvigorated an argument that the Court
killed and buried thirty years earlier.

E. Lemon Purpose Test
The Court also created confusion by not applying the Lemon
307
test.
More importantly, the Court abdicated, or at least
shirked, its responsibility to explain Lemon. Except for the first
few graduation prayer cases, the lower courts had consistently
declared graduation prayer invalid where the school had chosen the speaker and chosen to have a prayer. The disagreements arose as the facts changed so that the school had less input into the choice to have a prayer. The more important
disagreements were how to properly apply Lemon, in particular, how to apply the Lemon test to purpose and effect.
303. Id. at 586. The Court began its opinion stating, "[t]hese dominant facts mark
and control the confines of our decision ... "
304. Id. at 593.
305. This argument has not only been made but accepted by at least one court with
regard to graduation at state colleges. See Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232
(1997).
306. While some courts noted the voluntariness of attendance, no court has held
that coercion was necessary to prove an Establishment Clause violation.
307. As noted earlier this invited Justice Scalia's premature speculation that
Lemon might be dead.
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With regard to purpose and effect, the courts have debated
over whether to look at the purpose and effect of the graduation
or of the prayer. Some courts have held that the question is
what was the purpose and effect of graduation. They asked
whether the graduation ceremony had the purpose or effect of
endorsing or approving religion. Other courts focused on the
prayer itself, asking what is the purpose of prayer. The courts
almost invariably took a tautological approach to reach opposite results, each reasonable in light of two reasonable readings
of Lemon.
Some courts noted that Lemon merely requires a secular
purpose. Those courts concluded that graduation prayers always had the similar purpose of solemnizing an event. The conclusion is obvious and almost tautological. Indeed, it is very
reasonable that all religion has, and most religious activities
have, a secular purpose. Without extensive philosophical discussion, it is at least reasonable to argue that a secular purpose
could invariably include, inspiration to greatness, peace, happiness or morality. By the same token, prayer is by necessity
always religious, because it is only religious prayer which is
subject to Establishment Clause restrictions. Consequently,
other courts simply conclude the purpose and effect of prayer is
always religious. Instead of making any effort to shed light on
these problems, the Court ignored them, thereby passing on a
chance to provide enlightenment concerning a test which has
been difficult to apply.
The final irony of the Lemon purpose test is that one of the
308
Court's first cases to use the test was Abington. The school
had argued that it could lead students in prayer if the purpose
were "the promotion of moral values, the contradiction to the
materialistic trends of our institutions and the teaching of literature."309 Rather than simply reject this position as irrelevant
the Court found that the purpose of the school prayer was religious and helped spawn the confusion in the area of graduation
prayer, which it did little to clear up in Lee.
F. Government Speech I Private Speech
Besides relying on coercion as a reason to declare graduation prayer invalid, the Court's opinion in Lee also parallels
308. See Abington u. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
309. Id. at 223.
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Engel in other respects. There, the Court summarized the
Engel holding as follows: "[i]t is a cornerstone principle of our
Establishment Clause jurisprudence that 'it is no part of the
business of government to compose official prayers for any
group of the American people to recite as part of a religious
310
program carried on by the government'." The most common
questions courts asked about graduation included whether
graduation was a "religious program carried on by the government,"311 and whether graduation prayer was an official prayer.
Indeed, the first court to address these questions directly, in
Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township School District, distinguished
prayer in classrooms from graduation prayer saying, "in the
present case we do not have what amounts to official prayer,
312
nor does it constitute a religious program."
Some courts suggested that because the prayer occurred
only one time, it was not part of a prayer program and therefore permissible. Because these courts used the Lemon test,
they did not usually reference Engel or Abington directly. Instead, they attempted to distinguish the facts of these cases.
Some suggested distinctions were that (1) graduation was not
part of the regular curriculum; (2) attendance was not mandatory; (3) no money was spent for the prayer per se; (4) the
schools did not have a regular program of indoctrination. Like
many other courts, the Supreme Court in Lee also rejected
these positions.
In Lee, the Court refused to distinguish Engel. Instead, the
Court focused on the state's action and held that the prayer
was a state prayer program. Under Engel and Abington, that
would be enough to find a constitutional violation. The Court
needed to go no further from holding that graduation is part of
the entire school program. The holdings of Abington and Engel
easily encompassed a holding that graduation is an official
school event and that official prayer at such an event violated
313
the constitution.
310. Lee, 505 U.S. at 588 (quoting from Engel, 370 U.S. at 425).
311. Id.
312. Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township Sch. Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1293, 1294 (W.D. Pa.
1972).
313. As discussed earlier, the Court significantly weakened the strength of the
Engel protections by discussing coercion as a separate element of the solution. The correct understanding of the Establishment Clause is that coercion is inherent wherever
the government engages in religious exercises. See Engel, 370 U. S. 421; Abington, 374
U.S. 203.
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The final attempt to distinguish Engel and Abington, again
in the Lemon context, related to the question of whether the
graduation prayer was "official." In Engel, New York adopted a
program requiring daily participation in classroom prayers. In
Abington, a Pennsylvania statute required students to read
from The Bible. In other words, the State used prayers composed by someone else. In Lee, a third party was asked to compose a prayer and told what kind of prayer to comEose. Here,
3 4
the Court relied on Engel's "cornerstone principle." Throughout the opinion, the Court emphasized that the government
may not compose official prayers nor ask others to do so on its
behalf. The Court wrote: "our precedents do not permit school
315
officials to assist in composing prayers" and "the principal di~16
rected and controlled the content of the prayers." Once the
Court found that the school had essentially composed the
prayer, Lee became indistinguishable from Engel and Abington.
The Court's emphasis on state involvement in the composition of the prayer accomplished more than showing the similarities between Lee, Engel and Abington. At the beginning of
the Court's analysis, it notes, "[t]hese dominant facts mark and
control the confines of our decision: State officials direct the
317
performance of a formal religious exercise ... " The Court
then noted that "government involvement with religious activ318
ity in this case is pervasive." Other significant facts were
that the State decided to have a prayer, decided who would say
319
it and directed that it conform to certain principles. The government may not "undertake" for itself, the court said, the
"task" of composing nonsectarian prayer, which seeks to ad320
vance "community and purpose." In the end, the Court notes
that its "Establishment Clause jurisprudence remains a deli321
cate and fact-sensitive one."
These statements alone invite efforts to distinguish facts.
However, these statements are not the only invitation in Lee.
The end of the opinion in particular invites efforts to distin-

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Lee, 505 U.S. at 588.
I d. at 590.
I d. at 588.
Id. at 586.
Id. at 587.
I d.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 597.

156

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2001

guish prayer created by the state from other prayer at graduation. The opinion contains three passages that strongly suggest
that religion is not to be banished from ever coming into contact with the State. Furthermore, it also suggests that being offended, even deeply offended, by religious practices at any particular time does not mean the religious activity violates the
First Amendment. The Court stated:
We do not hold that every state action implicating religion is
invalid if one or a few citizens find it offensive. People may
take offense at all manner of religious as well as nonreligious
messages, but offense alone does not in every case show a
violation. We know too that sometimes to endure social
isolation or even anger may be the price of conscience or
nonconformity.

***
The First Amendment does not prohibit practices which by
any realistic measure create none of the dangers which it is
designed to prevent and which do not so directly or substantially involve the state in religious exercises or in the favoring
of religion as to have meaningful and practical impact. It is of
course true that great consequences can grow from small beginnings, but the measure of constitutional adjudication is the
ability and willingness to distinguish between real threat and
mere shadow. School Dist. of Abington u. Schempp, supra 374
322
U.S., at 308, 83 S. Ct .. , at 1616 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
These two passages are perhaps oblique invitations to distinguish Lee. Their significance was greatly enhanced by the
Court's last passage, which clearly indicated that the result
would not necessarily be the same if the facts were different.
A relentless and all-pervasive attempt to exclude religion
from every aspect of public life could itself become inconsistent with the Constitution.

***
We recognize that, at graduation time and throughout the
course of the education process, there will be instances when
religious values, religious practices, and religious persons will
have some interaction with the public schools and their students. See Board of Education of Westside Community Schools
u. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 110 L. Ed.2d 191
322. ld. at 598.
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(1990). But these matters, often questions of accommodation
. .
of re l IgiOn,
are not b efiore us. 323

Particularly si,pnificant to this passage is the Court's cita02
tion to Mergens. In Mergens, the Supreme Court upheld the
325
constitutionality of the Equal Access Act.
The plurality's
opinion in Mergens turned on distinguishing government
326
speech from "private speech."
With regard to government
speech, religious expression is almost, if not completely, prohibited.127 This is particularly true if it is part of a religious exercise.:128 With regard to private speech, the government must be
29
neutral.a Not only does Mergens hold that private religious
speech may be allowed when the same speech by the government is prohibited, it does so in the context of public schools.
330
In the last quoted passages from Lee, the Supreme Court
ties together a number of principles not necessary to the disposition of Lee: (1) State action implicating religion is not necessarily invalid; (2) a religious practice, even one implicating
state action, is not invalid simply because some are offended or
even forced into social isolation; (3) the Court will "distinguish
331
between real threat and mere shadow;" (4) private speech
can be protected religious expression, even in schools; and (5)
at graduation time, "religious practices ... will have some in332
teraction with the public schools and their students."
How these principles might be written or rewritten is not of
particular significance. What is important is the question
which is clearly left open, indeed invited. While the question
could be written other ways, one way of stating the question is:
whether and under what circumstances the First Amendment
prohibits a student from saying a prayer at graduation. If Lee
clearly left any question regarding graduation prayer unanswered, that was it. The Court focused significantly on the fact

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
ring)).
332.

!d. at 598-99.
Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
!d.; See 20 U.S.C.A. Sec. 4071(a).
!d. at 228.
!d.
Engel, 370 U. S. 421.
Mergens, 496 U.S. at 228-229.
Lee, 505 U.S. at 598, 599.
Lee, 505 U.S. at 598 (quoting Abington, 374 U.S. at 308 (Goldberg, J., concur!d. at 598-99.
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that the principal chose to have a prayer, chose a religious person to say the prayer and directed the content of the prayer.
The Court then gratuitously discussed the constitutional protection of private/student religious activities in both the school
and graduation context.
Even if these discussions were not an invitation to distinguish student prayers at graduation, they certainly provide
sufficient material to make a good faith argument that student
prayers are constitutionally distinguishable from those solicited by the principal in Lee.
The fact that this question is left open is further supported
by the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in a student-speech
graduation prayer case which was later remanded in light of
333
Lee. Clearly, the Court was aware of the arguments distinguishing government speech from private/student speech at
graduation. Just as clearly, the Court did not attempt to answer the question. And finally, the Court went out of its way to
distinguish government speech from private speech. Given that
our jurisprudence is based on factual distinctions, the Court
could hardly have made a more obvious invitation to argue that
student prayer at graduation is constitutionally different from
334
the school's prayer at graduation.
V. CONCLUSION

Lee rejected Marsh, ignored Lemon and weakened Engel.
The court was presented with the problem of how to apply
Lemon and refused to provide guidance. The Court followed
Engel's principle that the government may not engage in religious exercises but gratuitously added that such might not be
the case where adults are not coerced to conform. Finally, the
Court invited schools to defend student prayers at graduation.

333. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 505 U.S. 1215 (1992).
334. As it turned out, this distinction between student prayer and government
prayer was the focus of much of the Court's decision in Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2275.
The Court rejected Santa Fe's argument that the prayer at issue was private prayer,
but again implied that a prayer at school functions might be private prayer. The Court
noted, "[t)hese invocations are authorized by a government policy and take place on
government property at government-sponsored school related events." !d. at 2266. The
next sentence undercut the significance of those facts saying, "of course, not every message delivered under such circumstances is the government's own." !d. The clear implication remains that prayer, as private prayer, might be constitutionally permissible
even at public school ceremonies.
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The Court should have held Lemon to be irrelevant with regard
to religious exercises. It also should have followed Engel and
simply held that the government cannot create prayers and
prayer programs by asking others to create the prayers for the
government. This would prohibit prayers by ministers, students or anyone else, if the prayers had been requested or
urged by the government.

